The surprisingly peaceful and fair elections were marked by contentious intra-group campaigning as Sunni Awakening Forces challenged the dominant Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, and four Shiia parties (Maliki’s DAWA Party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Sadrists and the Fadhila Party) battled across Southern Iraq for electoral supremacy. Despite a lower than expected turnout of 51 percent, seven million Iraqi’s voted for 14,000 candidates vying for 440 provincial and local offices.

Nouri al Maliki, the once weak Prime Minister who controlled little more than Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone and a rump parliament, led the “State of the Law” coalition list to victory in seven provinces in predominantly Shiia southern Iraq. Maliki’s coalition captured a plurality of 38 percent in Baghdad and 37 percent in the strategic oil port city of Basra , where he directed the Iraqi National Army drive to oust Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi army in the summer of 2008. Maliki’s even scored a narrow two point victory in Najaf, the center of Iraq ’s Shiite religious movement and stronghold of Dawa’s rivals, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists.

The keys to Maliki’s success are instructive. Eschewing his DAWA Party’s religious themes, Maliki’s coalition ran on a platform of restoring law and order. He played to the Iraqi masses fatigue with sectarian conflict and argued that violence had been reduced to a minimum. Maliki trumpeted his leadership in signing the Status of Forces Agreement requiring all U.S. troops to leave Iraq by 2011, thereby muting the SIIC and Muqtada al Sadr’s rhetoric as the guardians of Iraqi nationalism. Next, Maliki maneuvered to divide his Shiia opponents by teaming with the SIIC and the Iranian government to subdue Muqtada al Sadr’s militias in Basra and Baghdad last July. Then Maliki sided with the weakened Sadr forces in the elections to curb the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s push for a nine-province Shiia super state in Southern Iraq , which runs counter to both their interest in a strong central government. Maliki also took advantage of the splits among Sunni and Sadists forces to secure electoral and military alliances. Finally, as the only major player in Iraq without loyal armed forces to back his writ, Maliki cobbled together a patchwork army. Maliki secured the loyalty of two divisions of the Iraq national army in Bagdad to control the capitol city and began paying tribal chiefs across Iraq to form “tribal council” militias to battle other militias and maintain order.

The big loser in the elections was the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim. The SIIC went into the elections with the most seats in parliament and majority control of the nine southern Iraq Shiia provinces. Their party list, Al-Mihrib Martyr List didn’t win a single province, but managed second place finishes in six provinces (Najaf, Qadisiyaya, Basra , Wasit, Muthana, Babil, Maysan and Dhi Qar). The SIIC platform called for more power to the provinces, the formation of Shiia super-state in Southern Iraq and expansion of an Islamic state. Ridiculed by the Sadrists for agreeing to the SOF, falling into disfavor with southern Iraqi Shiia for not delivering essential government services, and labeled as agents of their Iranian sponsors, SIIC will need to retool its organization and message for the upcoming Parliamentary elections to maintain its national power.

One of the most critical election battles took place in Anbar Province . Sunni Awakening forces who led the fight to defeat al Queda, challenged the dominant Sunni parliamentary party, the Islamic Iraqi Party (IIP). The Awakening and National Independent List finished in second place by one-half a percentage point behind the independent Sunni parliamentarian Salih al-Mutalk. The Islamic Iraqi Party came in a close third. The Awakening forces threatened to drown Anbar province in blood if the Islamic Iraqi Party finished first. Although neither the IIP nor the Awakening forces won, the results were so close that a recount was ordered, and the government imposed an immediate curfew in Anbar to impose order. The situation in Anbar remains tense.

While provincial elections in the Kurdish controlled provinces of Dohuk, Suleimaniyah and Erbil were suspended until the Iraqi government and the United Nations agree on a plan on the status of Kirkuk, the Kurds had a great deal at stake in two bordering provinces with large Kurdish populations. The Kurdish Alliance ran second in Ninewah with 25 percent of the vote and second in Diyalah with 17 percent of the vote. The loss in Ninewah to the new Arab nationalist Al Hadbaa List (38% of vote) was a big setback. Although Arabs in Ninewah are the majority the Kurds gained control of the provincial government when Sunni Arabs boycotted the 2005 election. Al Hadbaa has not only launched attacks on the Kurds, but is vehemently opposed to expansion of the Kurdish Region.

As the final results of Iraq ’s provincial elections are sorted out over the next two weeks, the struggles will begin to divide provincial governance assignments, local offices, and expenditure of provincial revenues. With not a single party list winning more than 50 percent of the votes in any of Iraq ’s 14 provinces, the winners will have to divide provincial offices with their adversaries, and the other minor parties. In most cases this will be a fractious process. In Anbar and Ninewah provinces, the potential outbreak of violence is very real. In order to preserve the gains that Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki made in the elections and to consolidate order across Iraq , he will need to respond appropriately with prudence to any flashpoints of contention.

Despite the difficult hurdles the Maliki government must clear going forward, the Iraqi provincial elections were a big success for the Obama administration. Had the elections been marred in violence and fraud, Iraq ’s fragile peace could have been plunged in chaos and Maliki’s regime severely undermined. The defeats of the dominant Shiia “Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council” in southern Iraq and the Kurdish setbacks in Ninewah and Diyalah provinces, has significantly slowed the momentum for federalism and a hard partition of Iraq. Moreover, the rising support for secular parties among the Shiia, Sunni and Kurds is an encouraging sign that polarizing sectarian-leaning parties may be on the decline. The parliamentary elections in December will be even more crucial in the re-alignment of national power sharing.

The victories scored by Maliki’s State of the Law list gives President Obama a stronger maximum leader across Iraq and a powerful proponent for approving the Status of Forces Agreement in the June 2009 national referendum. More importantly, these developments open a wider path of relative stability in Iraq that President Obama desperately needs to begin his proposed 16 month troop withdrawal plan.

Three-fourths of NATO supplies are transited to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Khyber Pass, located west of the NWFP capital of Peshawar. The Taliban has destroyed hundreds of NATO provision trucks, unleashed deadly attacks against NATO convoys and raided key supply depots. Emboldened by its success, the Taliban is now attempting to choke off the vital port city of Karachi, where the NATA logistics hub begins. The Pakistani military’s inability to drive the Taliban from the Northwest Territory combined with ISI support for the Taliban has made maintaining Pakistani supply routes too risky a proposition to sustain NATO growing operations in Afghanistan. The new Obama administration has continued its devastating Drone aerial attacks against Taliban strongholds on the Afghan-Pakistani border. But civilian deaths associated with the Drone attacks are fueling anger and anti-American sentiment on both sides of the border, while weakening the legitimacy of President Kharzai and President Zardari’s governments. For all these reasons opening a second supply front for U.S. and NATO operations emerged as “mission critical” to push forward President Obama’s Afghanistan surge campaign.

Pakistan’s deepening turmoil and U.S. reliance on a revanchist Russia to ensure its supply lines in Afghanistan are unsettling realities. But dragging the unstable nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into the equation represents a dangerous expansion of the “Long War” in Central Asia. U.S. negotiations with these countries over transit routes, access to air bases and foreign aid packages started before the 2001 Afghanistan invasion. The regional maneuvering has ebbed and flowed with the intensifying U.S.- Russian rivalry over Central Asian oil exploration, pipeline rights and the volatile internal politics of each country. Given the contention between the U.S. and Russia in Central Asia’s renewed “Great Game” a valid question arises; why has Russia come to the aid of its nemesis, the United States?

Moscow has a strategic interest in preventing the Taliban from toppling the government in Kabul, either directly or by leading a coalition of forces. The Taliban’s return to power would virtually eliminate Russian influence inside Afghanistan, whereas today Moscow has significant ties with Northern Alliance forces, President Kharzai and pro-Iranian forces inside Afghanistan. Furthermore, America’s aggressive efforts in Central Asia have led to the establishment of U.S. military installations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Moscow and China are deeply troubled by America’s expanded military profile in Central Asia. President Putin moved to facilitate the transit agreements, rather than risking the U.S. cutting deals with Central Asia regimes without Russian input. For his services to the United States, the Obama administration reciprocated by hitting the mute button regarding Putin’s shut down of natural gas flows to European countries in mid-winter; a manufactured crisis that allowed Russia to blame the Ukraine for the shortages while extorting higher gas transit prices from Kiev.

Beyond blocking U.S. encroachment in its security perimeter, Russia has a long-term security imperative of preventing the spread of radical Islam to its neighboring former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These countries on Russia’s southern border have large Muslim populations and indigenous radical Islamists organizations that threaten Moscow’s national security and hinder its efforts to keep the former Soviet republics within its sphere of influence. Inside Russia, the transformation of Chechnya’s nationalist movement into a jihadist juggernaut supported by its majority Muslim population led to a bloody 12-year succession struggle bordering on ethnic cleansing. There are 20 million self-identified Muslims in Russia, a number that has risen by 40% in the last 15 years. Russian sensitivity to its potential Islamic threat is real, and the destabilization of any of its Central Asian neighbors could be a lightning rod that ignites the fuse.

Obama’s new Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke will undoubtedly tout the benefits of U.S. anti-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan to curtail the flow of heroin that is devastating Central Asia and Russia. Construction projects, infrastructure development, U.S. dollars and other accoutrements showered on the Central Asian republics will ease the regional economic crisis and revive the failed “Silk Road” strategy of applying American soft power in Central Asia. Of particular concern to Obama’s foreign policy team will be buttressing Tajikistan; the poorest Central Asian country, rife with weapons and narcotics smuggling, and tense ethnic divisions with its Uzbek neighbors that could collapse the nation into a failed state. Such a development would increase the difficulties of stabilizing Afghanistan and heighten US-Russian regional geo-political rivalry.

For the United States and Russia, expanding the War in Afghanistan to the Central Asian steppes, even with a benign act of securing transit routes is a risk they are willing to take to prevent the Taliban from taking power in Kabul. What becomes problematic is the possibility that Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar is not to contending for state power, but destabilizing the Kharzai government to the point where the Taliban can maintain control of a limited number of provinces while expanding its sphere of influence. Indeed, what seems more likely is that the Afghan Taliban is working in concert with the newly emerging Pakistan Taliban and al Queda in an effort to establish a rump confederation that consolidates their joint control of Southeastern Afghanistan, Pakistan ’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Provinces. In short, these forces are carving out a failed state of Pushtanistan in the ungoverned territories along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

On January 22, President Obama called Pakistan and Afghanistan “the central front of terrorism,” and spoke of the necessity of eliminating this global threat starting in Afghanistan. By securing Russia’s aid to open new supply lines for NATO and U.S. forces, he just might be falling deeper into al Queda’s deadly trap of extending U.S. forces across Afghanistan, expanding unpopular bombing missions, increasing cross border excursions into Pakistan’s Northwest Territories and exposing more American forces to attack on the Central Asian steppes. The battlefield in Central Asia is being stretched. No one is sure where it will end.

In an eighty-eight word passage of his Inaugural Address, President Barak Obama issued an elegant but forceful repudiation of the past eight years of George Bush’s aggressive and misguided foreign policy doctrine. Without mentioning the word “torture” Obama rubuked the Bush administration’s premise that keeping America safe required torturing captured enemy combatants from Guantanamo to Abu Ghraib. Rejecting the application of raw American military power to achieve foreign policy objectives, Obama called for prudence and restraint in the use of force. Spurning the arrogance of taking unilateral actions to advance America’s interests at the expense of our friends, Obama invoked the vision of a new international community engaged in alliances and bound by principles and diplomacy.

Hoping to turn the page on Bush’s disastrous effort to convert the 911 terrorist attack on America into a crusade to clense the Middle East of extremists from Iran to Lebanon, Obama offered the world Muslim community “a new way forward based on mutual interests and respect.” In making the appeal Obama was sowing seeds he clearly hopes to harvest in his proposed upcoming major address in a Muslim country. With an escalating war to prosecute

in Afghanistan; a complicated and dangerous militaray drawdown to execute in Iraq, and the Arab street seething at Israel’s Gaza invasion that left 1,400 Palestinians dead, the new Commander-in Chief has to pivot quickly in the Middle East. Indeed, Obama will likely dispatch a special envoy to the Middle East this week to help ensure the uneasy cease fire brokered by the Egyptians between HAMAS and Israel’s holds until new talks begin.

While repudiating Bush’s militarist drive to make the U.S. the world’s unchallenged superpower for decades to come, Obama left no doubt that “terrorists” should not mistake his change of direction for weakness. Quite the opposite, Obama was sending a direct message to al Queda that he is coming after them, saying “you will not out wait us, we will defeat you.” Obama’s warning’s were not reserved soley for America’s avowed enemies. Breaking with the Bush administration’s silence on Arab authoritarian regimes it supported, Obama offered the following advise; “To those who cling to power through corruption and deciept and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.” Obama’s not so subtle warning aimed at the Sunni monarchies in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf Emirates, that America will not come to your aid to suppress rebellions provoked by your repressive regimes will be heard in capitals across the Middle East.

Perhaps the most significant point in Obama’s Inaugural Address was what he did not mention; Iran. There were no warnings or condemnations of Iran as the “world’s leading nuclear proliferator and state sponsor of terrorism that were the hallmark of Bush’s incendiary rhetoric. It was Obama’s first opportunity to set the tone with Iran before a world audience. Through his silence, Barak Obama left the door open to Tehran.

At the end of the day President Barak Obama’s central message was that we live in a far different world than America’s political leaders have been willing to acknowledge. The United States is no longer omnipotent, and we cannot simply push countries around. Military power has real limitations and the world’s wealth has been dispersed among rising nations that no longer march to Washington, D.C.’s drumbeat. We are entering a new multipolar era where global cooperation, diplomacy and shared decision making regarding the global economy, access to energy resouces and forging durable international security arrangements are the industry of many nations. Obama’s has asked America’s reluctanct political machine to grow up and change with the times. For many in America’s power elite, it is a change they do not believe in.

The siege of Mumbai by extremists with Pakistani ties nearly provoked an Indo-Pakistani confrontation and caused outrage among the Indian people at its government’s failure to prevent the attack. The attacks underscored how India’s combustible domestic and regional issues can lead to dangerous confrontations with its volatile neighbors. Add to the equation an internal Naxalbite insurgency in 13 provinces, a civil war in neighboring Sri Lanka that has inflamed its own Tamil population for three decades and sporadic Sikh breakaway movements that have prompted deadly violence in Northwest India and Afghanistan, and you have a recipe for domestic turmoil.
As a reliable U.S. ally in a region where America has few friends, Obama’s relationship with India will begin with a strong foundation. India voted for U.N. sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program at the risk of jeopardizing its pending 25 year multi-billon dollar proposal to secure oil from Tehran. India also launched an Israeli over-watch satellite to monitor Iranian nuclear development activities. New Delhi has contributed more peacekeeping troops to international hotspots than any other nation, and grants American access to its naval ports that are critical to patrolling strategic waterways in the Indian Ocean. In 2005, India and the U.S. signed a 10-year defense agreement that ex­panded joint military exercises, increased defense-related trade and established a defense procurement group. The U.S. and India have conducted more than 50 military exer­cises since 2002, demonstrating how far the mili­tary partnership has progressed in a relatively short period.

Ironically, if not tragically India’s 911 moment in Mumbai could be the most important development since the 2006 nuclear agreement that will cement U.S.-Indian relations. When pressed on India’s right to strike Pakistan after Mumbai, Obama said “every sovereign nation has a right to defend itself.” Fortunately, India’s decision not to seek retribution against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks marked a major step forward in its ascendency as a responsible power. An attack on Pakistan may have satisfied domestic calls for revenge but almost certainly would have led to armed clashes with Islamabad and possibly dragged other nations and non-state actors like al Queda into a regional conflagration.

However, India is stepping up its profile in Afghanistan and its virtual proxy war with Pakistan. Increasingly both countries view Afghanistan as part of its own security perimeter and India is determined to prevent a full blown Taliban resurgence. Indian embassies are up and running in Afghanistan. India is also creating stronger alliances with Kharzi and Northern Alliance forces and stirring the waters of Baluchistan resistance against Islamabad. On January 13, Khazi and Prime Minister Singh signed a joint letter urging Pakistan to stop its support of terrorist groups. India must tread carefully in Afghanistan, as many in Pakistan already subscribe to the notion that the U.S. and India are conspiring to encircle Pakistan and carve it up into small principalities.

Obama has expressed his clear support for strengthening America’s relationship with India. He has stated without reservation that Pakistan’s main threat is not India; but the growing Taliban/al Queda axis spreading in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Kashmiri terrorists. In his September 23 letter to Indian Prime Minister Singh, then Presidential candidate Obama voiced strong support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and called for redoubling U.S.-Indian military, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. But Obama has also made some initial missteps with India.

Although India shares strategic interests with the United States, the Obama administration must recognize that India has its own universe of national security considerations. Kashmir is a case in point. Obama’s suggestion that he would appoint a special envoy to help resolve the Kashmir border dispute with Pakistan was well intentioned, but not well received in New Delhi. India’s government balked at the notion of an special envoy, saying Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. On November 15, Obama dispatched the new Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry to New Delhi to acknowledge that Obama had no intention of interfering in the Kashmir issue. India is open to a political settlement but is not ready to give up territory in Kashmir or surrender its independence of action. India was also alarmed at statements Obama made during his campaign that America outsourced too many jobs to India. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Obama and Prime Singh’s telephone conversation seems to have eased some of New Delhi’s apprehension.

Similarly, although India voted for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, the Bush administration attempted to bully New Delhi to revoke its oil deal with Tehran. But strongarming India didn’t prevent the Chinese from underbidding India for global oil contracts, and the U.S. isn’t providing oil to heat homes in Bangalore and New Delhi. Obama will have to be prepared to accept similar tradeoffs with India, especially concerning its relationship with China.

Despite its four wars and nuclear standoffs with Pakistan since the 1947 partition, it is India’s contentious relationship with China that has enormous global implications. China is Pakistan’s most powerful ally and sponsored its drive to go nuclear. The two countries with world’s largest populations are engaged in a heated rivalry for energy resources, economic markets in Southeast Asia, and military advantage across continental Asia. India and America are both peacefully engaged with China, but both countries are troubled by China growing military strength. Neither India nor America wants Asia to be dominated by a single country. Indeed it’s hard to imagine a peaceful Asia in which there is not cooperation between India, the United States and China.

India’s $40 billion trade package with China is a promising sign of cooperation between the two economic titans, but the list of explosive issues between Beijing and New Delhi is long. Movement toward a settlement of its 1,300 mile border dispute with China has slowed to a crawl. In the meantime China’s military has breeched the border of the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunchal Pradesh on several occasions. China has also been busy developing strategic naval and trade port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chittatong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka and its new port in Gwadar, Pakistan. Connect the dots and China’s aggressive agenda has the look and feel of a military encirclement campaign, rather than protecting sea lanes and ensuring the delivery of energy supplies as China contends.

For Barak Obama, monitoring developments between India and China will be important. The U.S. must avoid putting New Delhi in any awkward situation in which it appears that India is being pitted against China for the benefit of the United States strategic interest. The U.S. must find creative ways to support India, not intervene on its behalf. India will balk at such moves and China will react with hostility. The more India and China broaden their ongoing diplomatic talks and the U.S. engages Beijing, the greater the chances that flashpoints of conflict can be peacefully resolved.

By continuing to help India integrate its economy with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the smaller Southeast Asian nations, the United States can greatly assist in promoting stability in the Pacific Rim. With the development of India’s civil nuclear power program and working jointly on environmental issues, America and India can build a very special relationship between the largest democracies in the Western and Eastern hemispheres. India’s road ahead will be filled with twist and turns, and the avoidance of open conflict between Pakistan or China is indispensible to India’s ascent. The fact that India has come so far in building democracy in the world’s most diverse society is part of the new story of the 21 st Century. A smart, nimble and patient American foreign policy toward India under the Obama Administration can truly help change the face of the Asian continent.

India’s challenges as an emerging global power are formidable and complex. With one billion people speaking 22 official languages in 1,656 dialects, India’s democracy is rent with tension between its Hindu majority and numerous ethnic groups. India’s 130 million Muslims constitutes the second largest Muslim population of any country in the world and makes India an inviting target for Muslim extremists and Salafists. In 2007, over 1000 deaths were attributed to terrorists attacks as India has the 4 th highest terrorist related death rate internationally.

The siege of Mumbai by extremists with Pakistani ties nearly provoked an Indo-Pakistani confrontation and caused outrage among the Indian people at its government’s failure to prevent the attack. The attacks underscored how India’s combustible domestic and regional issues can lead to dangerous confrontations with its volatile neighbors. Add to the equation an internal Naxalbite insurgency in 13 provinces, a civil war in neighboring Sri Lanka that has inflamed its India’s own Tamil population for three decades and sporadic Sikh breakaway movements that have prompted deadly violence in Northwest India and Afghanistan, and you have a recipe for domestic turmoil.

As a reliable U.S. ally in a region where America has few friends, Obama’s relationship with India will begin with a strong foundation. India voted for U.N. sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program at the risk of jeopardizing its pending 25 year multi-billon dollar proposal to secure oil from Tehran. India also launched an Israeli over-watch satellite to monitor Iranian nuclear development activities. New Delhi has contributed more peacekeeping troops to international hotspots than any other nation, and grants American access to its naval ports that are critical to patrolling strategic waterways in the Indian Ocean . In 2005, India and the U.S. signed a 10-year defense agreement that ex­panded joint military exercises, increased defense-related trade and established a defense procurement group. The U.S. and India have conducted more than 50 military exer­cises since 2002, demonstrating how far the mili­tary partnership has progressed in a relatively short period.

Ironically, if not tragically India’s 911 moment in Mumbai could be the most important development since the 2006 nuclear agreement that will cement U.S.-Indian relations. When pressed on India’s right to strike Pakistan after Mumbai, Obama said “every sovereign nation has a right to defend itself.” Fortunately, India ’s decision not to seek retribution against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks marked a major step forward in its ascendency as a responsible power. An attack on Pakistan may have satisfied domestic calls for revenge but almost certainly would have led to armed clashes with Islamabad and possibly dragged other nations and non-state actors like al Queda into a regional conflagration.

However, India is stepping up its profile in Afghanistan and its virtual proxy war with Pakistan. Increasingly both countries view Afghanistan as part of its own security perimeter and India is determined to prevent a full blown Taliban resurgence. Indian embassies are up and running in Afghanistan. India is also creating stronger alliances with Kharzi and Northern Alliance forces and stirring the waters of Baluchistan resistance against Islamabad. On January 13, Khazi and Prime Minister Singh signed a joint letter urging Pakistan to stop its support of terrorist groups. India must tread carefully in Afghanistan, as many in Pakistan already subscribe to the notion that the U.S. and India are conspiring to encircle Pakistan and carve it up into small principalities.

Obama has expressed his clear support for strengthening America’s relationship with India. He has stated without reservation that Pakistan’s main threat is not India; but the growing Taliban/al Queda axis spreading in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Kashmiri terrorists. In his September 23 letter to Indian Prime Minister Singh, then Presidential candidate Obama voiced strong support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and called for redoubling U.S.-Indian military, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. But Obama has also made some initial missteps with India.

Although India shares strategic interests with the United States, the Obama administration must recognize that India has its own universe of national security considerations. Kashmir is a case in point. Obama’s suggestion that he would appoint a special envoy to help resolve the Kashmir border dispute with Pakistan was well intentioned, but not well received in New Delhi. India’s government balked at the notion of an special envoy, saying Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. On November 15, Obama dispatched the new Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry to New Delhi to acknowledge that Obama had no intention of interfering in the Kashmir issue. India is open to a political settlements but is not ready to give up territory in Kashmir or surrender its independence of action. India was also alarmed at statements Obama made during his campaign that America outsourced too many jobs to India. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Obama and Prime Singh’s telephone conversation seems to have eased some of New Delhi’s apprehension.

Similarly, although India voted for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, the Bush administration attempted to bully New Delhi to revoke its oil deal with Tehran. But strongarming India didn’t prevent the Chinese from underbidding India for global oil contracts, and the U.S. isn’t providing oil to heat homes in Bangalore and New Delhi. Obama will have to be prepared to accept similar tradeoffs with India, especially concerning its relationship with China.

Despite its four wars and nuclear standoffs with Pakistan since the 1947 partition, it is India’s contentious relationship with China that has enormous global implications. China is Pakistan’s most powerful ally, and sponsored its drive to go nuclear. The two countries with world’s largest populations are engaged in a heated rivalry for energy resources, economic markets in Southeast Asia, and military advantage across continental Asia. India and America are both peacefully engaged with China, but both countries are troubled by China growing military strength. Neither India nor America wants Asia to be dominated by a single country. Indeed it’s hard to imagine a peaceful Asia in which there is not cooperation between India, the United States and China.

India’s $40 billion trade packages with China is a promising sign of cooperation between the two economic titans, but the list of explosive issues between Beijing and New Delhi is long. Movement toward a settlement of its 1,300 mile border dispute with China has slowed to a crawl. In the meantime China’s military has breeched the border of the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunchal Pradesh on several occasions. China has also been busy developing strategic naval and trade port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chittatong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka and its new port in Gwadar, Pakistan. Connect the dots and China’s aggressive agenda has the look and feel of a military encirclement campaign, rather than protecting sea lanes and ensuring the delivery of energy supplies as China contends.

For Barack Obama, monitoring developments between India and China will be important. The U.S. must avoid putting New Delhi in any awkward situation in which it appears that India is being pitted against China for the benefit of the United States strategic interest. The U.S. must find creative ways to support India, not intervene on its behalf. India will balk at such moves and China will react with hostility. The more India and China broaden their ongoing diplomatic talks and the U.S. engages Beijing, the greater the chances that flashpoints of conflict can be peacefully resolved.

By continuing to help India integrate its economy with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the smaller Southeast Asian nations, the United States can greatly assist in promoting stability in the Pacific Rim. With the development of India’s civil nuclear power program and working jointly on environmental issues, America and India can build a very special relationship between the largest democracies in the Western and Eastern hemispheres. India’s road ahead will be filled with twist and turns, and the avoidance of open conflict between Pakistan or China is indispensible to India’s ascent. The fact that India has come so far in building democracy in the world’s most diverse society is part of the new story of the 21 st Century. A smart, nimble and patient American foreign policy toward India under the Obama Administration can truly help change the face of the Asian continent.

Once Israel has visited as much destruction as possible in Gaza over the
next two weeks, Israel’s next prime minister, Palestinian Authority leader
Mahmoud Abbas and soon-to-be President Obama will proceed to craft
incremental agreements. Substantial resources will be committed to rebuild
the West Bank, while the war torn Gaza Strip is left economically and
politically isolated. In other words, the failed Two-State Solution will
devolve into a de-facto One and One-Half State Solution until such time as
Gaza is subdued and purged of its extremist efforts.

If this new strategic turn sounds highly unlikely, its far more feasible
than the prospects of Abbas and Al Fatah reconciling their differences
with HAMAS. HAMAS’s shocking electoral victory over Al Fatah in 2005, and
smashing Al Fatah in the Gaza Civil War in 2007 has left more bad blood on
the floor than can be overcome in the short run. Nor is reconciliation on
Abbas’s agenda. Israel’s strike to neutralize HAMAS’s leadership and
degrade its growing military capability was designed to elevate Al Fatah
to the only legitimate internationally recognized representative of the
Palestinian people. Thus the stage is set to engineer new talks favorable
to Israel and Abbas that will rise to the top of Obama’s crowded foreign
policy agenda when he takes office.

In the short run calls from the European Union, the United Nations and the
broader international community for a cease fire will fall on deaf ears.
Israel’s air and ground war will likely continue up to Obama’s
inauguration, or until international pressure for a cease fire outweighs
the military value of completing the mission. Tel Aviv’s phantom goal of
eliminating HAMAS’s capacity to launch rockets into Israel is a thinly
veiled justification for an open-ended invasion and occupation of Gaza.
Predictably the invasion was backed by U.S. Secretary of State Rice with a
familiar refrain that the U.S. wants a cease fire, but cannot support a
return to the “status quo ante.” Under the slogan of searching for a
“durable peace” the U.S. will stand by Israel until the job is done.

In a repeat performance of Israel’s 2006 invasion of Lebanon, the
Sunni-led Arab regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf
States are all supporting Israel’s actions in the hope that HAMAS will be
severely crippled or defeated. HAMAS’s downsizing will relieve the Arab
kings and sultans of the burden of hypocritically supporting HAMAS’s
anti-Israel and anti-U.S. leadership backed by Shiia-led Iran and enjoying
support on the Arab street.

It is not insignificant that today the three most popular leaders in the
Sunni majority Middle East are Shiia Muslims (Nasrallah-Lebanon’s
Hezbollah leader, Syrian President Bashir Assad and Iranian President
Ahmadinejad). More importantly, the Sunni Arab monarchs want to see Iran’s
support and strength diminished by the defeat of HAMAS which secures
funds, arms and political support from Tehran. Iran and Shiia Islam’s
influence that is metastasizing across the Middle East is a direct threat
to the Sunni monarch’s authoritarian rule. Another important component of
the invasion strategy to reduce Iran’s profile is to demonstrate to Syria
that its best interests would be served by jettisoning Iran and joining
Israel, the Palestinian Authority and the Quartet’s new peace born-of-war
solution. For Egypt and Saudi Arabia who have invested a great deal in
promoting their own Israeli-Palestinian peace plans and cease fire
agreements, HAMAS’s defeat is critical to stopping Iran’s momentum.

Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah have resisted attempts to be drawn into
the conflict. While condemning the invasion Hezbollah will not unleash its
own rocket attacks against northern Israel unless HAMAS is in jeopardy of
being totally wiped out. Hezbollah’s priority is consolidating its
political gains from the 2006 victory against Israel and preparing to win
the parliamentary majority in Lebanon’s upcoming elections.

Despite the military setbacks HAMAS will suffer, it will survive and
rebuild its strength in Gaza. Iran and HAMAS are looking to the long run
and are confident that its Al Fatah rivals will lose support over time for
its complicity with Israel and the U.S. in supporting the invasion. Iran
will bide its time and settle for being the beneficiary of heightened
anti-U.S. sentiments that continue to deepen across the Middle East. In
the West Bank, al Fatah is attempting to suppress mass demonstrations by
Palestinians supporting HAMAS and Abbas has even blamed HAMAS for starting
the conflict, as if who shot first is the essential question at hand.

In the final analysis there is not going to be a comprehensive
Israeli-Palestinian peace until there are peacemakers and peacekeepers on
both sides of the conflict. Between the Israelis, Al Fatah and HAMAS, the
invasion places the prospects for peace even further in the distant
future. That is precisely why the quest for reconciliation between HAMAS
and Al Fatah has been abandoned by the U.S., Israel and the Palestinian
Authority.

So what will the new Obama administration do? The conflict has forced
Obama’s hand. He cannot retreat or put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on
the back burner. Nor is it guaranteed that a cease fire will occur. Wars
have uncertain outcomes, and the West Bank could erupt even if Hezbollah
keeps its powder dry in Lebanon. Moreover, Obama has two wars to prosecute
in Afghanistan and Iraq that are far more strategic to the U.S. and its
allies. The Persian Gulf is still the critical ground zero of the Middle
East, and its oil is the lubricant powering a tottering world economy that
cannot withstand another short-term energy jolt.

With no prospects of a comprehensive peace in the Levant, Obama will have
to go slow and embrace the concept of extracting whatever short term
concessions he can out of the situation. The de-facto One and One-Half
State Solution will likely be his best option. Obama and the Europeans
could pursue a soft strategy of building agreements short of changing any
of the base terms of the Roadmap. Massive injections of capital and
economic development projects in the West Bank will be critical to
pacifying West Bank Palestinians and doing what hasn’t been done;
improving their daily lives. They are tired of empty talk, promises, and
peace plans that yield more violence and suffering.

Israel would have to agree to stop construction of its settlements in the
West Bank and roll back some of its roadblocks and checkpoints. Abbas and
the new incoming Israeli Prime Minister (most likely Netanyahu) would
agree to a cease fire in the West Bank. Egypt, Jordan and the Saudis would
need to invest in the West Bank development initiative with substantial
support from international NGO’s to monitor the Palestinian Authority
administration of finances and development projects. A small international
peace keeping force may also be inserted in the West Bank. In short, the
goal would be to economically and politically isolate Gaza and HAMAS, but
not militarily attack HAMAS. Presumably, Israel’s invasion would reduce
HAMAS’s capacity and appetite for conflict. Palestinians would therefore
have two distinct paths to choose from; a potentially prosperous and
peaceful West Bank or a struggling and chaotic Gaza.

The One and One-Half State solution is a roll of the dice, but it is a
chance to try something new to produce tangible progress in the West Bank
instead of more non-productive peace talks. It is a dangerous initiative
that would require patience to endure the blow back that will come from
turning Gaza into an island of desolation for an undetermined time. If
Obama is lucky, HAMAS’s may actually be forced concentrate on rebuilding
GAZA and defer on launching rockets into southern Israel. The struggle in
the Levant is moving to another level. Condoleezza Rice was correct when
she said there can be no return to the “status quo ante.” Going backwards
is not an option or possibility. The question is whether developments move
in the direction of peace and stability or towards a deepening of the
crisis. The hour for all sides to cast off unrealistic dreams committed to
paper in far away places like Oslo is at hand.

The excitement in Iran surrounding Obama’s election and his campaign pledge to engage in talks with no pre-conditions has faded. Vowing to use “more persuasive” carrots and sticks, or force if necessary to nudge Iran off its nuclear path, Iran ’s leaders condemned Obama’s remarks as more of the same Bush polices. After nominating the conspicuously pro-Israel Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State , Iran ’s clerical and state ministry leaders concluded that Obama’s posture toward Tehran has calcified with diminishing prospects for change; at least until the June elections.

Leaving aside the incessant rhetoric characterizing Iran as a rouge state led by medieval mullahs, Tehran has transformed itself from Khomenei’s chaotic Islamic state into a classic regional hegemonic power. As a largely symbolic leader, Ahmadinejad embodies a confrontational response to the Bush administration’s aggressive regime change agenda. Whether he can serve as an effective spokesman for the newer imperatives of consolidating Iran ’s emerging power bases in Iraq , Afghanistan , Syria , Lebanon and the Gaza Strip is the subject of debate raging inside Iran ’s ruling circles.

Four names continue to surface as possible presidential candidates in 2009; Parliament speaker and former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, former President Mohammad Khatami, Expediency Council leader Hashemi Rafsanjani and Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf. Ironically, Ahmadinejad beat three of the four potential candidates in the 2005 elections and Khatami has already served as President. Iranian conservatives and pragmatists working for Ahmadinejads defeat are reluctant to consider new blood, but they are moving to close ranks behind an anti-Ahmadinejad unity candidate. The stakes are too high to risk another 2005 surprise election that elevated Ahmadinejad from relative anonymity to the presidency. If the consensus candidate is not former President Khatami, Iran ’s new president could well be Baqer Qalibaf, the up-and- coming mayor of Tehran .

According to the Iranian blogger Zamin, Qalibaf has “spent the last few years remaking himself into a hardworking and successful mayor of Iran ’s most important city.. He has been quietly working on development projects in Tehran and building political bridges with Iranian and foreign leaders. This year he traveled to Iraq and met with Ayatollah Sistani, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, President Jalal Talabani and the mayor of Baghdad whom he pledged to help rebuild the Iraqi capital city. Qalibaf has positioned himself as a moderate who favors diplomacy and pragmatism over rhetoric and saber-rattling. He has a distinguished background in both the Basij and Revolutionary Guards (he retired as a Major-General), earned a Ph.D. in political science, and was Chief of Police for Tehran .”

Qalibaf, is a compelling candidate, but it is circumstances on the ground in Iran that are moving the Persian street against Ahmadinejad. With a 25% inflation rate, 20% unemployment and oil prices that declined $100 a barrel since June, Ahmadinejad’s reformists and conservative opponents are attacking his failed economic policies and broken promises to end corruption and spread Iran ’s oil wealth to its poorest citizens. Quite the opposite his subsidy programs have fueled rampant inflation. Petrol rationing, power blackouts, water shortages and limited access to investment capital is squeezing Iran ’s economy. Even Iran ’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, publicly counseled Ahmadinejad in April to “pay attention to inflation.” W hen Ahmadinejad blamed his critic’s failed nuclear negotiations with Europe for the harsh economic sanctions imposed on Iran , Larijani countered that Ahmadinejad was too pro-U.S. for considering the opening of a U.S. Interest Section in Tehran . In domestic and foreign policy, these instances illustrate the difficulties hard line conservatives are having uniting behind Ahmadinejad’s United Principalist Front.

While speculation intensifies about who will be Iran ’s next president, the emerging consensus across the political spectrum regarding Tehran ’s expanding regional role in the Middle East is of greater significance to the incoming Obama administration. Iran wants America to acknowledge its sphere of influence in Iraq . The clerics and power ministry leaders also want a cessation of U.S. support for the Jundalla, the Mujahidin-eKhalq and PEJAK anti-Iranian forces operating inside its borders. Iran wants to be treated as an equal and indispensible player on energy issues in the Persian Gulf and better prices for its oil. Iran also wants fairness and greater access to opportunity for Shiia minority communities across the Middle East .

These issues are negotiable and could form the basis for start-up talks between Iran ’s new president and the Obama administration, either separate from the nuclear issue or on a two-track approach. On the other hand, Obama may continue the Bush policy of direct talks until Iran halts all work on its enrichment program. It is a policy Iran will never agree to; a policy that will allow Iran to continue its enrichment activity with no verification process; a policy that can only increase the possibility of U.S. / Israel air strikes against Iran without eliminating Iran ’s nuclear program. It is a policy Obama should abandon in favor of direct negotiations.

For Barak Obama, who said that Iran will not be allowed to develop a nuclear weapon, time is running out and so are his options. Iran will master the enrichment process to make a nuclear weapon during his first term of office. The elections in June 2009 may present Obama with his first big chance to alter the trajectory of U.S. Iran relations that are headed for a collision. He should take it.

There are three hurdles that Obama must clear to prevent a breakdown of Iraq ’s fragile peace. To close out the war as promised, Barak Obama must navigate a tenuous Status of Forces agreement and pacify the Sunni while integrating them into the national army and Iraq ’s oil economy. But his first obstacle will be the outcome of the January provincial elections, which are going to increase tension and violence across the country.

The Sunni will participate in greater numbers than the two previous national elections. But if they don’t secure sufficient political power to ensure their interests are met, the political chasm in Iraq will widen and the Sunni may return to violence to force another hearing of their grievances. Tension will also flare between the Sunni because “Awakening” candidates will contest and in some cases defeat powerful members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni party in Iraq now.

In southern Iraq , Nouri al Maliki’s Dawa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq will face off. In the aftermath of the inter-Shiia war in Basra, friction between the two parties is sharpening over control of the national parliament. The radical nationalist Muqtada al Sadr’s forces will oppose both parties for signing the Status of Forces agreement which he claims surrenders Iraq ’s sovereignty.

The provincial elections in Kurdistan have been postponed until an agreement is reached on the status of the oil rich city of Kirkuk; Iraq’s most volatile fault line. The Kurds insist that Kirkuk be incorporated into the Kurdistan’s autonomous region and won’t take no for an answer. They shouldn’t. As the largest ethnic group in the world with no homeland, it’s time they be made whole. With Kirkuk integrated into Kurdistan, the oil revenue generated would not only power Erbil from autonomy to virtual independence, but shake up the region.

In addition to the Sunni and local Turkomen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the U.S. will all oppose Kurdistan’s drive to bring Kirkuk into its fold. Violence is already being unleashed in Kirkuk and tension is running high. The Kirkuk referendum has been referred to the United Nations for reconciliation, but the day is coming when Kurdistan cannot be denied. At the end of the day the Shiia will likely side with the Kurds on Kirkuk, or risk fracturing the alliance they need to consolidate their grip on the rest of the country.

Another flash point of contention will be incorporating the Sunni Awakening forces into the national army and police forces. Some 91,000 “Sons of Iraq” forces were on the United States payroll fighting al Queda–many of them were former Baathists. How much the Shiia majority chooses to integrate them into the army and national police force is a critical and touchy power sharing issue. If these Sunni soldiers are not integrated into the security forces, and instead are tossed into unemployment lines, it will be an open invitation for them to resume sectarian warfare, or worse—renew their alliance with remaining al Queda Iraq forces. Last month, the Iraqi government began paying the Awakening soldiers, but they must go further to fully integrate them into the national army and national police forces in the post-election period.

If things go reasonably well after the elections Obama may have enough daylight to begin his 16 month troop withdrawal. Obama’s withdrawal timetable was not realistic when he made it and is even less realistic today; which explains why he has modified his position, saying all “combat” troops will be out of Iraq in 16 months. Iraq ’s national army and police will not be prepared to take full control by July 2010—as evidenced by the Status of Forces (SOF) agreement that calls for U.S. forces to be out of Iraq ’s cities by June 2009 and out of Iraq completely by 2011.

While the SOF has been approved by Iraq ’s parliament, it must still be approved in a June 2009 referendum; an awkward timetable considering all U.S. forces must be out of the cities in June 2009. Who is to say that the Iraqi mass will approve the SOF? U.S. commanders in Iraq are already suggesting that not all their soldiers will be out of Iraq ’s cities by June 2009, and that training forces may need to remain in the cities. For both Shiia and Sunni forces looking to undermine al Maliki, the public statements by U.S. commanders are damaging.

For Maliki who gave an ironclad promise that U.S. troops will not be in Iraq any longer than 2011, the pressure is on. As for Obama, many have speculated that the SOF has given him more breathing room to gage how safely and how fast they can redeploy troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, where the situation is deteriorating with each passing day.

Much of the focus has been on how the Status of Forces agreement will impact security within Iraq and Obama’s withdrawal plan. But the long-range strategic implications of the SOF are enormous. Acceptance of the Status of Forces agreement means that a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq will no longer be a reality—a complete reversal Bush’s strategic plan that was predicated on a robust U.S. military presence to project power across the Middle East for years, if not decades to come. Nor will there be a credible counterweight in the Middle East with the strategic depth and proximity to counter Iran ’s growing dominance of the Persian Gulf.

For 25 years Saddam Hussein kept the neighborhood safe for Sunni Arab monarchies and gulf sheikdoms, until he finally turned on them. With Saddam gone and the Shiia majority controlling the machinery of governance, Iran is slowly and methodically tightening its grip on Iraq . Iran has effectively annexed southern Iraq. Their proxies control Basra, the crown economic jewel of Iraq, where they are siphoning of millions of barrels of oil and revenue from the nation’s principal seaport. Iranian rials are the currency of commerce and choice in Southern Iraq. Having neutralized moderate Shiia clerics, including the Ayatollah Sistani, Iran controls the mosque and charities, and is slowly transferring the religious center of international Shiia from Najaf to Qom, Iran. Whether it takes five years or ten years, Iran will eventually dominate Iraq through its sophisticated system of indirect proxy rule that was perfected in Lebanon with the Hezbolla over a 20 year period. Bush’s strategic blunder in Iraq, is a national security setback in the region for the United States. Iraq is now in the orbit of Iran’s expanding sphere of influence. At best, Obama’s can limit the damage by getting out of Iraq in good order and moving on to Afghanistan where events are growing even more complicated.

Wars, like life, have uncertain outcomes. While there is a good chance that Barak Obama can affect an orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq without the country spiraling into chaos, there is also much that could go wrong. Ironically, it is Iran that is best positioned to help Obama keep the peace in Iraq. For the cautious and inexperienced Obama, it’s highly unlikely he will have the maturity to grasp and act on this fundamental reality. For that reason, 2009 will be Obama’s year of living dangerously in Iraq.