The surprisingly peaceful and fair elections were marked by contentious intra-group campaigning as Sunni Awakening Forces challenged the dominant Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party, and four Shiia parties (Maliki’s DAWA Party, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Sadrists and the Fadhila Party) battled across Southern Iraq for electoral supremacy. Despite a lower than expected turnout of 51 percent, seven million Iraqi’s voted for 14,000 candidates vying for 440 provincial and local offices.

Nouri al Maliki, the once weak Prime Minister who controlled little more than Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone and a rump parliament, led the “State of the Law” coalition list to victory in seven provinces in predominantly Shiia southern Iraq. Maliki’s coalition captured a plurality of 38 percent in Baghdad and 37 percent in the strategic oil port city of Basra , where he directed the Iraqi National Army drive to oust Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi army in the summer of 2008. Maliki’s even scored a narrow two point victory in Najaf, the center of Iraq ’s Shiite religious movement and stronghold of Dawa’s rivals, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists.

The keys to Maliki’s success are instructive. Eschewing his DAWA Party’s religious themes, Maliki’s coalition ran on a platform of restoring law and order. He played to the Iraqi masses fatigue with sectarian conflict and argued that violence had been reduced to a minimum. Maliki trumpeted his leadership in signing the Status of Forces Agreement requiring all U.S. troops to leave Iraq by 2011, thereby muting the SIIC and Muqtada al Sadr’s rhetoric as the guardians of Iraqi nationalism. Next, Maliki maneuvered to divide his Shiia opponents by teaming with the SIIC and the Iranian government to subdue Muqtada al Sadr’s militias in Basra and Baghdad last July. Then Maliki sided with the weakened Sadr forces in the elections to curb the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s push for a nine-province Shiia super state in Southern Iraq , which runs counter to both their interest in a strong central government. Maliki also took advantage of the splits among Sunni and Sadists forces to secure electoral and military alliances. Finally, as the only major player in Iraq without loyal armed forces to back his writ, Maliki cobbled together a patchwork army. Maliki secured the loyalty of two divisions of the Iraq national army in Bagdad to control the capitol city and began paying tribal chiefs across Iraq to form “tribal council” militias to battle other militias and maintain order.

The big loser in the elections was the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, led by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim. The SIIC went into the elections with the most seats in parliament and majority control of the nine southern Iraq Shiia provinces. Their party list, Al-Mihrib Martyr List didn’t win a single province, but managed second place finishes in six provinces (Najaf, Qadisiyaya, Basra , Wasit, Muthana, Babil, Maysan and Dhi Qar). The SIIC platform called for more power to the provinces, the formation of Shiia super-state in Southern Iraq and expansion of an Islamic state. Ridiculed by the Sadrists for agreeing to the SOF, falling into disfavor with southern Iraqi Shiia for not delivering essential government services, and labeled as agents of their Iranian sponsors, SIIC will need to retool its organization and message for the upcoming Parliamentary elections to maintain its national power.

One of the most critical election battles took place in Anbar Province . Sunni Awakening forces who led the fight to defeat al Queda, challenged the dominant Sunni parliamentary party, the Islamic Iraqi Party (IIP). The Awakening and National Independent List finished in second place by one-half a percentage point behind the independent Sunni parliamentarian Salih al-Mutalk. The Islamic Iraqi Party came in a close third. The Awakening forces threatened to drown Anbar province in blood if the Islamic Iraqi Party finished first. Although neither the IIP nor the Awakening forces won, the results were so close that a recount was ordered, and the government imposed an immediate curfew in Anbar to impose order. The situation in Anbar remains tense.

While provincial elections in the Kurdish controlled provinces of Dohuk, Suleimaniyah and Erbil were suspended until the Iraqi government and the United Nations agree on a plan on the status of Kirkuk, the Kurds had a great deal at stake in two bordering provinces with large Kurdish populations. The Kurdish Alliance ran second in Ninewah with 25 percent of the vote and second in Diyalah with 17 percent of the vote. The loss in Ninewah to the new Arab nationalist Al Hadbaa List (38% of vote) was a big setback. Although Arabs in Ninewah are the majority the Kurds gained control of the provincial government when Sunni Arabs boycotted the 2005 election. Al Hadbaa has not only launched attacks on the Kurds, but is vehemently opposed to expansion of the Kurdish Region.

As the final results of Iraq ’s provincial elections are sorted out over the next two weeks, the struggles will begin to divide provincial governance assignments, local offices, and expenditure of provincial revenues. With not a single party list winning more than 50 percent of the votes in any of Iraq ’s 14 provinces, the winners will have to divide provincial offices with their adversaries, and the other minor parties. In most cases this will be a fractious process. In Anbar and Ninewah provinces, the potential outbreak of violence is very real. In order to preserve the gains that Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki made in the elections and to consolidate order across Iraq , he will need to respond appropriately with prudence to any flashpoints of contention.

Despite the difficult hurdles the Maliki government must clear going forward, the Iraqi provincial elections were a big success for the Obama administration. Had the elections been marred in violence and fraud, Iraq ’s fragile peace could have been plunged in chaos and Maliki’s regime severely undermined. The defeats of the dominant Shiia “Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council” in southern Iraq and the Kurdish setbacks in Ninewah and Diyalah provinces, has significantly slowed the momentum for federalism and a hard partition of Iraq. Moreover, the rising support for secular parties among the Shiia, Sunni and Kurds is an encouraging sign that polarizing sectarian-leaning parties may be on the decline. The parliamentary elections in December will be even more crucial in the re-alignment of national power sharing.

The victories scored by Maliki’s State of the Law list gives President Obama a stronger maximum leader across Iraq and a powerful proponent for approving the Status of Forces Agreement in the June 2009 national referendum. More importantly, these developments open a wider path of relative stability in Iraq that President Obama desperately needs to begin his proposed 16 month troop withdrawal plan.

There are three hurdles that Obama must clear to prevent a breakdown of Iraq ’s fragile peace. To close out the war as promised, Barak Obama must navigate a tenuous Status of Forces agreement and pacify the Sunni while integrating them into the national army and Iraq ’s oil economy. But his first obstacle will be the outcome of the January provincial elections, which are going to increase tension and violence across the country.

The Sunni will participate in greater numbers than the two previous national elections. But if they don’t secure sufficient political power to ensure their interests are met, the political chasm in Iraq will widen and the Sunni may return to violence to force another hearing of their grievances. Tension will also flare between the Sunni because “Awakening” candidates will contest and in some cases defeat powerful members of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni party in Iraq now.

In southern Iraq , Nouri al Maliki’s Dawa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq will face off. In the aftermath of the inter-Shiia war in Basra, friction between the two parties is sharpening over control of the national parliament. The radical nationalist Muqtada al Sadr’s forces will oppose both parties for signing the Status of Forces agreement which he claims surrenders Iraq ’s sovereignty.

The provincial elections in Kurdistan have been postponed until an agreement is reached on the status of the oil rich city of Kirkuk; Iraq’s most volatile fault line. The Kurds insist that Kirkuk be incorporated into the Kurdistan’s autonomous region and won’t take no for an answer. They shouldn’t. As the largest ethnic group in the world with no homeland, it’s time they be made whole. With Kirkuk integrated into Kurdistan, the oil revenue generated would not only power Erbil from autonomy to virtual independence, but shake up the region.

In addition to the Sunni and local Turkomen, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the U.S. will all oppose Kurdistan’s drive to bring Kirkuk into its fold. Violence is already being unleashed in Kirkuk and tension is running high. The Kirkuk referendum has been referred to the United Nations for reconciliation, but the day is coming when Kurdistan cannot be denied. At the end of the day the Shiia will likely side with the Kurds on Kirkuk, or risk fracturing the alliance they need to consolidate their grip on the rest of the country.

Another flash point of contention will be incorporating the Sunni Awakening forces into the national army and police forces. Some 91,000 “Sons of Iraq” forces were on the United States payroll fighting al Queda–many of them were former Baathists. How much the Shiia majority chooses to integrate them into the army and national police force is a critical and touchy power sharing issue. If these Sunni soldiers are not integrated into the security forces, and instead are tossed into unemployment lines, it will be an open invitation for them to resume sectarian warfare, or worse—renew their alliance with remaining al Queda Iraq forces. Last month, the Iraqi government began paying the Awakening soldiers, but they must go further to fully integrate them into the national army and national police forces in the post-election period.

If things go reasonably well after the elections Obama may have enough daylight to begin his 16 month troop withdrawal. Obama’s withdrawal timetable was not realistic when he made it and is even less realistic today; which explains why he has modified his position, saying all “combat” troops will be out of Iraq in 16 months. Iraq ’s national army and police will not be prepared to take full control by July 2010—as evidenced by the Status of Forces (SOF) agreement that calls for U.S. forces to be out of Iraq ’s cities by June 2009 and out of Iraq completely by 2011.

While the SOF has been approved by Iraq ’s parliament, it must still be approved in a June 2009 referendum; an awkward timetable considering all U.S. forces must be out of the cities in June 2009. Who is to say that the Iraqi mass will approve the SOF? U.S. commanders in Iraq are already suggesting that not all their soldiers will be out of Iraq ’s cities by June 2009, and that training forces may need to remain in the cities. For both Shiia and Sunni forces looking to undermine al Maliki, the public statements by U.S. commanders are damaging.

For Maliki who gave an ironclad promise that U.S. troops will not be in Iraq any longer than 2011, the pressure is on. As for Obama, many have speculated that the SOF has given him more breathing room to gage how safely and how fast they can redeploy troops from Iraq to Afghanistan, where the situation is deteriorating with each passing day.

Much of the focus has been on how the Status of Forces agreement will impact security within Iraq and Obama’s withdrawal plan. But the long-range strategic implications of the SOF are enormous. Acceptance of the Status of Forces agreement means that a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq will no longer be a reality—a complete reversal Bush’s strategic plan that was predicated on a robust U.S. military presence to project power across the Middle East for years, if not decades to come. Nor will there be a credible counterweight in the Middle East with the strategic depth and proximity to counter Iran ’s growing dominance of the Persian Gulf.

For 25 years Saddam Hussein kept the neighborhood safe for Sunni Arab monarchies and gulf sheikdoms, until he finally turned on them. With Saddam gone and the Shiia majority controlling the machinery of governance, Iran is slowly and methodically tightening its grip on Iraq . Iran has effectively annexed southern Iraq. Their proxies control Basra, the crown economic jewel of Iraq, where they are siphoning of millions of barrels of oil and revenue from the nation’s principal seaport. Iranian rials are the currency of commerce and choice in Southern Iraq. Having neutralized moderate Shiia clerics, including the Ayatollah Sistani, Iran controls the mosque and charities, and is slowly transferring the religious center of international Shiia from Najaf to Qom, Iran. Whether it takes five years or ten years, Iran will eventually dominate Iraq through its sophisticated system of indirect proxy rule that was perfected in Lebanon with the Hezbolla over a 20 year period. Bush’s strategic blunder in Iraq, is a national security setback in the region for the United States. Iraq is now in the orbit of Iran’s expanding sphere of influence. At best, Obama’s can limit the damage by getting out of Iraq in good order and moving on to Afghanistan where events are growing even more complicated.

Wars, like life, have uncertain outcomes. While there is a good chance that Barak Obama can affect an orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq without the country spiraling into chaos, there is also much that could go wrong. Ironically, it is Iran that is best positioned to help Obama keep the peace in Iraq. For the cautious and inexperienced Obama, it’s highly unlikely he will have the maturity to grasp and act on this fundamental reality. For that reason, 2009 will be Obama’s year of living dangerously in Iraq.

Of course, most Americans are preoccupied with the fact that the stock market dropped again today, housing prices continue to slump, consumer confidence is at record lows and we want a government that will do something about this, not be obsessed with who Barack Obama met a couple times years ago. Besides, this “news” is five years old. If Obama’s character is such an issue, why did they wait so long to bring this up?

John McCain and Sarah Palin could care less about what Americans need. Instead, they care about irrelevent things that Barack Obama did years ago and dividing Americans into us and them. It’s really a sad display of desperation and a book that keeps writing itself – “How Not To Run A Presidential Campaign.”

Did you hear the one about Obama being a Muslim? But, I thought he attended a church for years that employed an anti-American reverend. Since when do Muslims have reverends? The Republican ticket can’t even keep their nonsense straight anymore.

The calculus of a new Iraq peace strategy that incorporates Iran’s cooperation is straight forward. Iran wants dramatic reductions of the 130,000 U.S. troops perched on its borders and threatening its national security. Tehran also wants an end to U.S. troop cross border raids and ongoing U.S. covert operations inside Iran authorized by President Bush’s executive finding in 2007. On the other side of the ledger Obama needs to start moving troops out of Iraq immediately and shifting forces to Afghanistan. He also needs Iran’s help to reign in Iraqi Shiite militias, and push Shiite leaders to negotiate in good faith by giving minority Sunni forces enough political and economic clout to avoid the resumption of sectarian warfare.

Barak Obama is fully aware that his 16 month troop withdrawal timetable is not realistic. Iraq’s government, national army and national police will not be prepared to take full control by August 2010. Thus, he must play for time to allow Iraq’s government to stabilize while national reconciliation inches forward. If violence and U.S. troop deaths are minimal, Americans will be forgiving of an extended timetable. The critical next step in the process and one that is out of Obama’s control is the Status of Forces Agreement currently being negotiated with Iraq. It calls for U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraq’s major cities by June 2009, and for all U.S. troops to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. Under pressure from other radical Shiite forces and Iran to shorten the timeline, Maliki announced on October 19 that the agreement is not satisfactory and must be amended before being voted on by Iraq’s parliament. Thus, the Status of Forces Agreement will shape the withdrawal timeline that Obama ultimately will navigate.

Going forward, the political and military landmines that could impede progress toward a U.S. troop withdrawals in Iraq are formidable. Extremists and al Qaeda forces will not go gently from Iraq. Obama and American military leaders in Iraq will also need to craft a strategy to maintain the military separation between the Sunni Awakening forces and al Queda. In addition to the political reconciliation process, Obama will need the assistance of Iran and Saudi Arabia to help broker and guarantee agreements between the Sunni, the Kurds and the majority Shiite. The next big hurdle will be the national and provential elections in Iraq in 2009, and the explosive referendum on the status of Kirkuk. Ironically, Iran also has presidential elections in 2009. If President Ahmadinijad is defeated by a more “moderate” candidate, Obama’s ability to work with Iran and sell his policy to the Ameircan people could become immeasurably easier.

To secure Iran’s cooperation in Iraq, Obama must make the first move. At the moment, Iran holds a strong position in Iraq. Iran’s long standing ties with Iraq’s majority Shiite religious community, its substantial economic investments in Iraq and its ties to the Kurdish political leaders constitutes substantial political clout. Thus, it’s unlikely that Obama can coerce Iranian cooperation by threatening aerial strikes against their nuclear sites, getting sanctions on Iranian gas imports or an improbable land invasion. Quite the opposite, Obama could open the door to direct talks with Iran on the Iraqi conflict with soft power. By reviving recently scuttled proposals to establish direct commercial airline flights between Iran and America, and by resurrecting talks on opening a U.S. Interest Section in Tehran, Obama could signal to Iran’s Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei that there is a genuine interest in diplomacy.

Apart from direct talks with Iran on Iraq, Obama should revive the Geneva Contact Group with Iran to discuss a broader array of issues. The Contact Groups’ back channel negotiations proved invaluable in gaining Iran’s assistance at the outset of the U.S. Afghanistan invasion. Obama will also be under tremendous pressure from Republicans and military hawks to halt Iran’s nuclear drive to master the uranium enrichment process. Obama’s initial efforts will likely center around getting an IAEA verification team back on the ground in Iran. Obama can score a huge political breakthrough if he can convince the Iranians to temporarily suspend enrichment activity while getting the inspection teams up and running. However, he may have to settle for allowing enrichment to continue as a condition for getting the inspection teams back in. The nexus of Obama’s position must be that today we have the worse of both worlds; no IAEA nuclear inspections and Iran’s continuation of the enrichment process. The non-starter that Obama must avoid is insisting that Iran stop its uranium enrichment program as a pre-condition to talks.

What is most critical to a new Obama administration’s foreign policy approach in the Persian Gulf is to cultivate an environment that encourages Iran to re-examine the opportunities to improve its relations with the United States and its own national security interest. Iraq is the place where the national security interest of the U.S. and Iran intersect and both sides have something to gain. If substantial progress can be made there, the potential to achieve progress in Afghanistan and on the nuclear standoff will be dramatically improved.