Three-fourths of NATO supplies are transited to Afghanistan through Pakistan’s Khyber Pass, located west of the NWFP capital of Peshawar. The Taliban has destroyed hundreds of NATO provision trucks, unleashed deadly attacks against NATO convoys and raided key supply depots. Emboldened by its success, the Taliban is now attempting to choke off the vital port city of Karachi, where the NATA logistics hub begins. The Pakistani military’s inability to drive the Taliban from the Northwest Territory combined with ISI support for the Taliban has made maintaining Pakistani supply routes too risky a proposition to sustain NATO growing operations in Afghanistan. The new Obama administration has continued its devastating Drone aerial attacks against Taliban strongholds on the Afghan-Pakistani border. But civilian deaths associated with the Drone attacks are fueling anger and anti-American sentiment on both sides of the border, while weakening the legitimacy of President Kharzai and President Zardari’s governments. For all these reasons opening a second supply front for U.S. and NATO operations emerged as “mission critical” to push forward President Obama’s Afghanistan surge campaign.

Pakistan’s deepening turmoil and U.S. reliance on a revanchist Russia to ensure its supply lines in Afghanistan are unsettling realities. But dragging the unstable nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan into the equation represents a dangerous expansion of the “Long War” in Central Asia. U.S. negotiations with these countries over transit routes, access to air bases and foreign aid packages started before the 2001 Afghanistan invasion. The regional maneuvering has ebbed and flowed with the intensifying U.S.- Russian rivalry over Central Asian oil exploration, pipeline rights and the volatile internal politics of each country. Given the contention between the U.S. and Russia in Central Asia’s renewed “Great Game” a valid question arises; why has Russia come to the aid of its nemesis, the United States?

Moscow has a strategic interest in preventing the Taliban from toppling the government in Kabul, either directly or by leading a coalition of forces. The Taliban’s return to power would virtually eliminate Russian influence inside Afghanistan, whereas today Moscow has significant ties with Northern Alliance forces, President Kharzai and pro-Iranian forces inside Afghanistan. Furthermore, America’s aggressive efforts in Central Asia have led to the establishment of U.S. military installations in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Moscow and China are deeply troubled by America’s expanded military profile in Central Asia. President Putin moved to facilitate the transit agreements, rather than risking the U.S. cutting deals with Central Asia regimes without Russian input. For his services to the United States, the Obama administration reciprocated by hitting the mute button regarding Putin’s shut down of natural gas flows to European countries in mid-winter; a manufactured crisis that allowed Russia to blame the Ukraine for the shortages while extorting higher gas transit prices from Kiev.

Beyond blocking U.S. encroachment in its security perimeter, Russia has a long-term security imperative of preventing the spread of radical Islam to its neighboring former Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These countries on Russia’s southern border have large Muslim populations and indigenous radical Islamists organizations that threaten Moscow’s national security and hinder its efforts to keep the former Soviet republics within its sphere of influence. Inside Russia, the transformation of Chechnya’s nationalist movement into a jihadist juggernaut supported by its majority Muslim population led to a bloody 12-year succession struggle bordering on ethnic cleansing. There are 20 million self-identified Muslims in Russia, a number that has risen by 40% in the last 15 years. Russian sensitivity to its potential Islamic threat is real, and the destabilization of any of its Central Asian neighbors could be a lightning rod that ignites the fuse.

Obama’s new Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke will undoubtedly tout the benefits of U.S. anti-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan to curtail the flow of heroin that is devastating Central Asia and Russia. Construction projects, infrastructure development, U.S. dollars and other accoutrements showered on the Central Asian republics will ease the regional economic crisis and revive the failed “Silk Road” strategy of applying American soft power in Central Asia. Of particular concern to Obama’s foreign policy team will be buttressing Tajikistan; the poorest Central Asian country, rife with weapons and narcotics smuggling, and tense ethnic divisions with its Uzbek neighbors that could collapse the nation into a failed state. Such a development would increase the difficulties of stabilizing Afghanistan and heighten US-Russian regional geo-political rivalry.

For the United States and Russia, expanding the War in Afghanistan to the Central Asian steppes, even with a benign act of securing transit routes is a risk they are willing to take to prevent the Taliban from taking power in Kabul. What becomes problematic is the possibility that Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Omar is not to contending for state power, but destabilizing the Kharzai government to the point where the Taliban can maintain control of a limited number of provinces while expanding its sphere of influence. Indeed, what seems more likely is that the Afghan Taliban is working in concert with the newly emerging Pakistan Taliban and al Queda in an effort to establish a rump confederation that consolidates their joint control of Southeastern Afghanistan, Pakistan ’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Provinces. In short, these forces are carving out a failed state of Pushtanistan in the ungoverned territories along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.

On January 22, President Obama called Pakistan and Afghanistan “the central front of terrorism,” and spoke of the necessity of eliminating this global threat starting in Afghanistan. By securing Russia’s aid to open new supply lines for NATO and U.S. forces, he just might be falling deeper into al Queda’s deadly trap of extending U.S. forces across Afghanistan, expanding unpopular bombing missions, increasing cross border excursions into Pakistan’s Northwest Territories and exposing more American forces to attack on the Central Asian steppes. The battlefield in Central Asia is being stretched. No one is sure where it will end.

The siege of Mumbai by extremists with Pakistani ties nearly provoked an Indo-Pakistani confrontation and caused outrage among the Indian people at its government’s failure to prevent the attack. The attacks underscored how India’s combustible domestic and regional issues can lead to dangerous confrontations with its volatile neighbors. Add to the equation an internal Naxalbite insurgency in 13 provinces, a civil war in neighboring Sri Lanka that has inflamed its own Tamil population for three decades and sporadic Sikh breakaway movements that have prompted deadly violence in Northwest India and Afghanistan, and you have a recipe for domestic turmoil.
As a reliable U.S. ally in a region where America has few friends, Obama’s relationship with India will begin with a strong foundation. India voted for U.N. sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program at the risk of jeopardizing its pending 25 year multi-billon dollar proposal to secure oil from Tehran. India also launched an Israeli over-watch satellite to monitor Iranian nuclear development activities. New Delhi has contributed more peacekeeping troops to international hotspots than any other nation, and grants American access to its naval ports that are critical to patrolling strategic waterways in the Indian Ocean. In 2005, India and the U.S. signed a 10-year defense agreement that ex­panded joint military exercises, increased defense-related trade and established a defense procurement group. The U.S. and India have conducted more than 50 military exer­cises since 2002, demonstrating how far the mili­tary partnership has progressed in a relatively short period.

Ironically, if not tragically India’s 911 moment in Mumbai could be the most important development since the 2006 nuclear agreement that will cement U.S.-Indian relations. When pressed on India’s right to strike Pakistan after Mumbai, Obama said “every sovereign nation has a right to defend itself.” Fortunately, India’s decision not to seek retribution against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks marked a major step forward in its ascendency as a responsible power. An attack on Pakistan may have satisfied domestic calls for revenge but almost certainly would have led to armed clashes with Islamabad and possibly dragged other nations and non-state actors like al Queda into a regional conflagration.

However, India is stepping up its profile in Afghanistan and its virtual proxy war with Pakistan. Increasingly both countries view Afghanistan as part of its own security perimeter and India is determined to prevent a full blown Taliban resurgence. Indian embassies are up and running in Afghanistan. India is also creating stronger alliances with Kharzi and Northern Alliance forces and stirring the waters of Baluchistan resistance against Islamabad. On January 13, Khazi and Prime Minister Singh signed a joint letter urging Pakistan to stop its support of terrorist groups. India must tread carefully in Afghanistan, as many in Pakistan already subscribe to the notion that the U.S. and India are conspiring to encircle Pakistan and carve it up into small principalities.

Obama has expressed his clear support for strengthening America’s relationship with India. He has stated without reservation that Pakistan’s main threat is not India; but the growing Taliban/al Queda axis spreading in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Kashmiri terrorists. In his September 23 letter to Indian Prime Minister Singh, then Presidential candidate Obama voiced strong support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and called for redoubling U.S.-Indian military, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. But Obama has also made some initial missteps with India.

Although India shares strategic interests with the United States, the Obama administration must recognize that India has its own universe of national security considerations. Kashmir is a case in point. Obama’s suggestion that he would appoint a special envoy to help resolve the Kashmir border dispute with Pakistan was well intentioned, but not well received in New Delhi. India’s government balked at the notion of an special envoy, saying Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. On November 15, Obama dispatched the new Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry to New Delhi to acknowledge that Obama had no intention of interfering in the Kashmir issue. India is open to a political settlement but is not ready to give up territory in Kashmir or surrender its independence of action. India was also alarmed at statements Obama made during his campaign that America outsourced too many jobs to India. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Obama and Prime Singh’s telephone conversation seems to have eased some of New Delhi’s apprehension.

Similarly, although India voted for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, the Bush administration attempted to bully New Delhi to revoke its oil deal with Tehran. But strongarming India didn’t prevent the Chinese from underbidding India for global oil contracts, and the U.S. isn’t providing oil to heat homes in Bangalore and New Delhi. Obama will have to be prepared to accept similar tradeoffs with India, especially concerning its relationship with China.

Despite its four wars and nuclear standoffs with Pakistan since the 1947 partition, it is India’s contentious relationship with China that has enormous global implications. China is Pakistan’s most powerful ally and sponsored its drive to go nuclear. The two countries with world’s largest populations are engaged in a heated rivalry for energy resources, economic markets in Southeast Asia, and military advantage across continental Asia. India and America are both peacefully engaged with China, but both countries are troubled by China growing military strength. Neither India nor America wants Asia to be dominated by a single country. Indeed it’s hard to imagine a peaceful Asia in which there is not cooperation between India, the United States and China.

India’s $40 billion trade package with China is a promising sign of cooperation between the two economic titans, but the list of explosive issues between Beijing and New Delhi is long. Movement toward a settlement of its 1,300 mile border dispute with China has slowed to a crawl. In the meantime China’s military has breeched the border of the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunchal Pradesh on several occasions. China has also been busy developing strategic naval and trade port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chittatong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka and its new port in Gwadar, Pakistan. Connect the dots and China’s aggressive agenda has the look and feel of a military encirclement campaign, rather than protecting sea lanes and ensuring the delivery of energy supplies as China contends.

For Barak Obama, monitoring developments between India and China will be important. The U.S. must avoid putting New Delhi in any awkward situation in which it appears that India is being pitted against China for the benefit of the United States strategic interest. The U.S. must find creative ways to support India, not intervene on its behalf. India will balk at such moves and China will react with hostility. The more India and China broaden their ongoing diplomatic talks and the U.S. engages Beijing, the greater the chances that flashpoints of conflict can be peacefully resolved.

By continuing to help India integrate its economy with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the smaller Southeast Asian nations, the United States can greatly assist in promoting stability in the Pacific Rim. With the development of India’s civil nuclear power program and working jointly on environmental issues, America and India can build a very special relationship between the largest democracies in the Western and Eastern hemispheres. India’s road ahead will be filled with twist and turns, and the avoidance of open conflict between Pakistan or China is indispensible to India’s ascent. The fact that India has come so far in building democracy in the world’s most diverse society is part of the new story of the 21 st Century. A smart, nimble and patient American foreign policy toward India under the Obama Administration can truly help change the face of the Asian continent.

India’s challenges as an emerging global power are formidable and complex. With one billion people speaking 22 official languages in 1,656 dialects, India’s democracy is rent with tension between its Hindu majority and numerous ethnic groups. India’s 130 million Muslims constitutes the second largest Muslim population of any country in the world and makes India an inviting target for Muslim extremists and Salafists. In 2007, over 1000 deaths were attributed to terrorists attacks as India has the 4 th highest terrorist related death rate internationally.

The siege of Mumbai by extremists with Pakistani ties nearly provoked an Indo-Pakistani confrontation and caused outrage among the Indian people at its government’s failure to prevent the attack. The attacks underscored how India’s combustible domestic and regional issues can lead to dangerous confrontations with its volatile neighbors. Add to the equation an internal Naxalbite insurgency in 13 provinces, a civil war in neighboring Sri Lanka that has inflamed its India’s own Tamil population for three decades and sporadic Sikh breakaway movements that have prompted deadly violence in Northwest India and Afghanistan, and you have a recipe for domestic turmoil.

As a reliable U.S. ally in a region where America has few friends, Obama’s relationship with India will begin with a strong foundation. India voted for U.N. sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program at the risk of jeopardizing its pending 25 year multi-billon dollar proposal to secure oil from Tehran. India also launched an Israeli over-watch satellite to monitor Iranian nuclear development activities. New Delhi has contributed more peacekeeping troops to international hotspots than any other nation, and grants American access to its naval ports that are critical to patrolling strategic waterways in the Indian Ocean . In 2005, India and the U.S. signed a 10-year defense agreement that ex­panded joint military exercises, increased defense-related trade and established a defense procurement group. The U.S. and India have conducted more than 50 military exer­cises since 2002, demonstrating how far the mili­tary partnership has progressed in a relatively short period.

Ironically, if not tragically India’s 911 moment in Mumbai could be the most important development since the 2006 nuclear agreement that will cement U.S.-Indian relations. When pressed on India’s right to strike Pakistan after Mumbai, Obama said “every sovereign nation has a right to defend itself.” Fortunately, India ’s decision not to seek retribution against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks marked a major step forward in its ascendency as a responsible power. An attack on Pakistan may have satisfied domestic calls for revenge but almost certainly would have led to armed clashes with Islamabad and possibly dragged other nations and non-state actors like al Queda into a regional conflagration.

However, India is stepping up its profile in Afghanistan and its virtual proxy war with Pakistan. Increasingly both countries view Afghanistan as part of its own security perimeter and India is determined to prevent a full blown Taliban resurgence. Indian embassies are up and running in Afghanistan. India is also creating stronger alliances with Kharzi and Northern Alliance forces and stirring the waters of Baluchistan resistance against Islamabad. On January 13, Khazi and Prime Minister Singh signed a joint letter urging Pakistan to stop its support of terrorist groups. India must tread carefully in Afghanistan, as many in Pakistan already subscribe to the notion that the U.S. and India are conspiring to encircle Pakistan and carve it up into small principalities.

Obama has expressed his clear support for strengthening America’s relationship with India. He has stated without reservation that Pakistan’s main threat is not India; but the growing Taliban/al Queda axis spreading in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Kashmiri terrorists. In his September 23 letter to Indian Prime Minister Singh, then Presidential candidate Obama voiced strong support for the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal and called for redoubling U.S.-Indian military, intelligence and law enforcement cooperation. But Obama has also made some initial missteps with India.

Although India shares strategic interests with the United States, the Obama administration must recognize that India has its own universe of national security considerations. Kashmir is a case in point. Obama’s suggestion that he would appoint a special envoy to help resolve the Kashmir border dispute with Pakistan was well intentioned, but not well received in New Delhi. India’s government balked at the notion of an special envoy, saying Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. On November 15, Obama dispatched the new Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry to New Delhi to acknowledge that Obama had no intention of interfering in the Kashmir issue. India is open to a political settlements but is not ready to give up territory in Kashmir or surrender its independence of action. India was also alarmed at statements Obama made during his campaign that America outsourced too many jobs to India. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai, Obama and Prime Singh’s telephone conversation seems to have eased some of New Delhi’s apprehension.

Similarly, although India voted for sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program, the Bush administration attempted to bully New Delhi to revoke its oil deal with Tehran. But strongarming India didn’t prevent the Chinese from underbidding India for global oil contracts, and the U.S. isn’t providing oil to heat homes in Bangalore and New Delhi. Obama will have to be prepared to accept similar tradeoffs with India, especially concerning its relationship with China.

Despite its four wars and nuclear standoffs with Pakistan since the 1947 partition, it is India’s contentious relationship with China that has enormous global implications. China is Pakistan’s most powerful ally, and sponsored its drive to go nuclear. The two countries with world’s largest populations are engaged in a heated rivalry for energy resources, economic markets in Southeast Asia, and military advantage across continental Asia. India and America are both peacefully engaged with China, but both countries are troubled by China growing military strength. Neither India nor America wants Asia to be dominated by a single country. Indeed it’s hard to imagine a peaceful Asia in which there is not cooperation between India, the United States and China.

India’s $40 billion trade packages with China is a promising sign of cooperation between the two economic titans, but the list of explosive issues between Beijing and New Delhi is long. Movement toward a settlement of its 1,300 mile border dispute with China has slowed to a crawl. In the meantime China’s military has breeched the border of the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunchal Pradesh on several occasions. China has also been busy developing strategic naval and trade port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chittatong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka and its new port in Gwadar, Pakistan. Connect the dots and China’s aggressive agenda has the look and feel of a military encirclement campaign, rather than protecting sea lanes and ensuring the delivery of energy supplies as China contends.

For Barack Obama, monitoring developments between India and China will be important. The U.S. must avoid putting New Delhi in any awkward situation in which it appears that India is being pitted against China for the benefit of the United States strategic interest. The U.S. must find creative ways to support India, not intervene on its behalf. India will balk at such moves and China will react with hostility. The more India and China broaden their ongoing diplomatic talks and the U.S. engages Beijing, the greater the chances that flashpoints of conflict can be peacefully resolved.

By continuing to help India integrate its economy with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the smaller Southeast Asian nations, the United States can greatly assist in promoting stability in the Pacific Rim. With the development of India’s civil nuclear power program and working jointly on environmental issues, America and India can build a very special relationship between the largest democracies in the Western and Eastern hemispheres. India’s road ahead will be filled with twist and turns, and the avoidance of open conflict between Pakistan or China is indispensible to India’s ascent. The fact that India has come so far in building democracy in the world’s most diverse society is part of the new story of the 21 st Century. A smart, nimble and patient American foreign policy toward India under the Obama Administration can truly help change the face of the Asian continent.

The emerging Central Asian crisis poses daunting challenges for the incoming Obama administration. President Karzai of Afghanistan and President Zardari of Pakistan are weak leaders of faltering governments that cannot be sustained without unpopular U.S. intervention. Since al Queda and the Taliban launched their ground offensive in May 2006 they now occupy military space in four Southeastern Afghanistan provinces, Baluchistan Province in Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (F.A.T.A.) and growing swaths of the North West Frontier Provinces (NWFP). A virtual failed state of Pashtunistan now exists in the majority Pashtun ethnic seam on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. While Obama promises to insert 10,000 additional troops in Afghanistan, most NATO countries in-theater refuse to allow their troops to engage the Taliban-leaving the brunt of the fighting to U.S. armed forces. Finally, Iran, Russia, India, China and Pakistan all have strategic designs on Afghanistan backed by armed proxies on the ground; few of which comport with U.S. interests.

The Obama administration’s national security goals in Central Asia have yet to be articulated, but preventing Afghanistan or Pakistan from becoming failed states is foremost on the agenda. The collapse of either government will unleash Al Queda, the Taliban and other extremists to expand their influence across Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Should Pakistan slide into chaos the prospects of loose nuclear technology floating on the black market has ominous implications. The global nerve center of terrorism has relocated to Pashtunistan where terrorist attacks on London, Madrid and Bali were all hatched, and where al Queda makes it new home. Therefore Obama must unite his European allies around a central strategy to bring Pakistan on side, dislodge Al Queda and the Taliban from Pashtunistan (FATA and the NWFP) and reach consensus on a long range plan to rebuild Afghanistan.

Al Queda’s long-term strategy is to draw the U.S. military into the Middle East, spread its forces thin and bleed the U.S. until it withdraws from the region. Weakened regimes left behind would have to fend for themselves against a radicalized Muslim street and potent non-state actors, as is feared in Iraq today. Thus, a sustained al Queda offensive in Pakistan could warrent U.S. intervention in its third Muslim country the past seven years. The alternative would be to risk Pakistan lapsing into a failed state. Aided by the Bush administration’s ill conceived and mismanaged war of choice in Iraq, Al Queda and anti-U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia have seized the initiative. They are selecting the time and place of battle and determining the choice of weapons. Given the magnitude and complexity of the challenges surfacing in Central Asia, how will President Barak Obama’s respond?

While stabilizing Afghanistan will require patience, perseverance and a renewed commitment by NATO, the situation in Pakistan has imparted a great sense of urgency and volatility to the Central Asian equation. The surprising strength of Al Queda’s resurgence in Pakistan and its alliance with the new Pakistani Taliban ( Tehrik-e-Taliban) poses an immediate threat to Pakistan. Pakistan’s economy is in a tailspin, which could fuel more discord among the Pakistani body-politic. Going forward Obama’s biggest problem may not be al Queda as much as the Pakistani Army and the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISA) whose loyalties remain divided between the Zardari government on the one hand and extremist Taliban and Kashmiri elements on the other. The Army and the ISI sponsored A.Q. Khan’s acquisition of nuclear technology to build Pakistan’s “Islamic” bomb, and provided cover for Khan’s black market sales bazaar of nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya. All this was done as a matter of state policy. Along with hosting and financing global terrorists since the beginning of Afghanistan’s resistance to the Soviets in 1979, the Army and ISI has done more to advance the cause of global terrorism than any other nation or non-state actor.

Having enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Territories since 2003, al Queda continues to receive aid and comfort from key sectors of the Army and the Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). Now al Queda has turned on the Pakistani government with a vengeance. Their sponsorship of Muslim extremists that provoked the Red Mosque massacres in Islamabad in 2007 marked a crucial turning point in Pakistan that re-energized the extremist Muslim movement. After the mosque massacre angry volunteers and madrassa students streamed into FATA and the NWFP. In November 2007, al Queda launched its biggest operation ever in Pakistan’s Swat Valley where thousands of Taliban, Chechens, Uzbeks and Arab jihadists joined AQ to blowup police stations, drive out local administrators, burned down girls schools, forced thousands to flee the fighting and shut down the Valley’s tourist economy. The Swat Valley offensive was followed by a wave of suicide bombings and assassination attempts against the military and leading Pakistani officials from Karachi to Rawalpindi to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. The scale of the offensive and the damage done to Pakistan’s tottering economy has unsettled Pakistan’s government and illuminated the red lights in the Pentagon’s Situation Room.

Fully aware of the implications of Al Queda’s offensive, in October Obama said “We have to make the case that the biggest threat to Pakistan is not India which has been the historical enemy. It is actually militants within their borders. If we get them to refocus on that, that’s going to be critical for our success, not just in stabilizing Pakistan but also in finishing the job in Afghanistan.” Obama’s message to Pakistani Prime Minister Galani and President Zardari was clear; the days of diverting billions in U.S. aid to fund Pakistan’s military operations against India and supporting Kashmir extremists are over. If Pakistan wants the proposed new $15 billion aid package, it must start rooting out Taliban and al Queda forces within its borders and scale back support for Kashmiri terrorists. To undermine al Queda and the army’s support for Kashmiri adventurism, Obama is thinking seriously about appointing a special envoy to finally broker a border settlement between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.

Despite his critics in the U.S. and Pakistan, Obama has refused to backtrack on his statement that if Pakistan doesn’t move on “actionable intelligence” to strike al Queda inside its borders, the United States will. In truth, Drone missile and U.S. helicopter gunship attacks on al Queda positions are increasing as the Bush presidency draws to a close. Should Pakistan’s Army and ISI continue to drag their feet on going after AQ and the Pakistani Taliban, Obama may be confronted with a game changing decision; whether to commit U.S. special forces in Pakistan. Even if bin Ladin is killed, al Queda is not going away. Committing ground forces with coordinated lethal air power may be the only option available to strike a decisive blow to al Queda and the Taliban. It could also ignite a wave of anti-U.S. outrage that threatens the political legitimacy of the Zardari-Galani government. While there are few good options in Pakistan, Al Queda’s operation in Pashtunistan must be shut down.

On the other side of the border Obama’s first move will be carrying through on his campaign pledge to redeploy two U.S. brigades from Iraq to Afghanistan. His objective will be expelling Mullah Omar’s Taliban forces from Kandahar and the poppy rich Helmund Province in Southern Afghanistan that provides millions in narco-trafficking revenue to the insurgency. Obama and his new CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus are both leaning toward a military “surge first” policy that creates conditions for negotiations to bring “moderate Taliban” elements into the government. In October, Obama said “I think that after talking to our commanders on the ground and based on sound intelligence, if we can peel off some support from the hardcore militants that are aligned with Al Qaeda that will be beneficial.”

To make this strategy work, the U.S. must hit the Taliban hard enough militarily to separate the Taliban and Pashtun tribes that truly want to enter a coalition government with Karzai, from diehard Taliban forces determined to undermine the government. The Taliban’s strategy is not to militarily topple the Karzai regime, but to undermine it while extending their influence. By destroying infrastructure, burning down schools, attacking NGO’s and targeting Aghan police officers they seek to make it impossible for Karzai to govern.

Increasing U.S. troop strength to 43,000 soldiers on the ground along with 30,000 NATO forces will allow the U.S/NATO corps to replicate the Iraq strategy of clearing territory; holding ground and building stable protected areas with the support of Afghan people. Implementing the “clear, hold and build” strategy will be far more difficult than it was in Iraq. Afghanistan’s land mass is considerably more vast and the Taliban much stronger and better organized than Iraq’s fractured political forces. Karzai’s government only controls one-third of the country, with warlords, Northern Alliance forces, and Iran wielding tremendous influence in Herat and Western Afghanistan.

The deployment of more U.S. troops and the “surge first” strategy will also send a strong message to Pakistan and others that the U.S. is making a long-term commitment to Afghanistan’s beleaguered government; a commitment the U.S. never made since its 2002 invasion. Karzai needs time and space to reign in the provincial warlords he’s allowed to run roughshod over the country. New estimates for rebuilding a credible the Afghan National Army and the Afghan Police Force has jumped from 65,000 to 200,000. And there are still the challenges of restoring basic services starting with water, electricity, schools and medical services.

Karzai has been widely discredited among Afghans as ineffective against tyrannical warlords, and an enabler of Afghanistan’s massive corruption. Karzai’s own brother has linked to drug trafficking. Obama could have Karzai on a short leash. Presidential elections are coming in 2009 and Karzai may not survive if an attractive Pashtun leader emerges to challenge for office.

The road forward in Afghanistan will be a long and difficult one that likely spans President Obama’s presidential term, even if re-elected. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, divided by many ethnic groups, warlords and foreign powers. The economic commitment necessary to overcome the effects of three decades of civil war is so large that U.S. and European leaders have yet to live up to their pledges made in of 2002. In the midst of the current global economic crisis, European largesse seems even less likely. The failure to defeat or co-opt the Taliban in Afghanistan will be a devastating blow to the effectiveness of NATO and the European Union, and would have serious repercussions for the future of global security.

General Petreaus, who is conducting a top-down review of CENTCOM operations in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, said last month that “The effort in Afghanistan is going to be the longest campaign of the long war.” Obama will do well to remember that. After all, he seeks to accomplish what Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, the British Raj and the Soviets could not; subdue Afghanistan’s insurgency with foreign troops and impose a proxy government on Kabul.

In the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto’s assassination in November 2007, her husband, Asif Zardari seized control of the PPP and is riding the wave of outrage against ousted dictator Pervez Musharraf to power. A Zardari victory on September 6, will consolidate the presidency, a parliamentary majority, the prime minister’s office, the National Assembly Speaker’s chair and the judiciary under the PPP; making Pakistan a virtual one-party state.

Zardari’s presidential candidacy clearly violates the coalition agreement signed with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (Pakistan ’s second largest party) and other paparty’s, stipulating that the next president would be non-partisan. He has dragged his feet on the coalition agreement to re-instate the judges dismissed during the Musharraf’s state of emergency, and back-tracked on the coalition agreement to rescind the president’s extra-constitutional powers to dissolve parliament and the judiciary; powers usurped by Musharraf under martial law. Thus, Zardari seeks to replace Pakistan’s brutal dictatorship with a more “enlightened” form of despotism.

Zadari’s power grab has the full backing of the Bush Administration and the army, which remains Pakistan’s most powerful institution. While Musharraf’s chosen successor, Army Chief of Staff Kayani has vowed to keep the military out of politics, Zardari has openly proclaimed “the establishment” is behind him. There can be little doubt that Musharraf, now resting comfortably in his suburban villa under the army’s protection, cut a deal with the United States, General Kayani, the Saudi’s and Zardari to resign as president if impeachment charges against him were dropped and he could remain in the country. In return, Kayani pledged the army’s loyalty to Zardari, but Musharraf is still pulling the strings behind the scenes.

Zardari’s betrayal of the democratic coalition was to be expected. He stepped into the political footprint of Benizer Bhutto who acquiesced to a power sharing arrangement with Musharraf and accommodation to the United States’ Pakistan agenda. But the political upsurge of millions of Pakistani’s led by the lawyer’s movement proved to be, and remains an obstacle to her successor Zardari’s rise to dynasty.

Zardari never wanted to enter a political alliance with the forces of democracy, but he had to. No sooner had the alliance served his purpose of getting rid of Musharraf, he broke all his commitments to the coalition. Zardari’s treachery left the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PLM-N) no choice but to quit the coalition. As the nation entered the final week before the elections, rumors swirled street that corruption charges against former Prime Minster Nawaz Shariff and PML-N leader, will be be reinstated; pouring more fuel on the smoldering fire. This kind of intimidation to opposition should be all to familiar to the Pakistani people. Meanwhile a power struggle has began over the Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous and politically powerful province. The PPP and PML-N are accusing each other of destabilizing the provincial government . The PML(N) carried the province in February’s parliamentary elections.

On the eve of the elections Pakistan’s political divide is clearly sharpening. Zardari has the support of the Awami National Party, pockets of Musharraf’s “Kings Party” (PML-Q) and provincial leaders of the NWFP and Balochistan. The lawyer’s movement, the BNP, and a number of smaller Muslim religious parties that accuse the PPP of selling out to the United States and want the judges restored are coalescing around Shariff’s PML-N. Shariff has also sought the support of the popular retired supreme court chief justice Saeed uz Zaman Siddiqui as his party’s presidential candidate.

While there is little doubt that Zardari will win the presidency, the breakup of Pakistan’s short lived democratic coalition will make the nation more vulnerable to the intrigues of the the army, the Inter Service Intelligence agency and the growing power of the Taliban-al Queda forces in the FATA and NWPF regions. If political chaos descends on Pakistan, the Army that has already led three coups will seize power and run the country with an iron fist and the United States’ blessing. Above all, the U.S. must have a trusted friend whose finger remains close to Pakistan’s nuclear button. Ironically, the British courts recently released Zardari’s 2007 physician’s reports that diagnosed him as suffering from severe psychiatric problems. The news of Zadari’s questionable mental state set off alarms in the situation room of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.

Despite Zardari’s victory on September 6, he will not be able hold back the tide of Pakistan’s democratic upsurge. Ultimately, all the U.S. backing, money and military power cannot prevail against the peoples desire to rebuild a more just and free Pakistan.. It is a lesson Zardari should have, but didn’t learn over the past year from the heroic Pakistani people. His unwillingness to share power and build a broad united front to extend Pakistan’s unique experiment with democracy will be his undoing. The question is; When things fall apart in Pakistan, who will be there to pick up the pieces?

While we foolishly diverted our attention and resources to Iraq, the Taliban have quietly been regrouping, waiting for the right moment to strike and today was their day of triumph. However, we are the ones that can gain from today by remembering who attacked the United States six years ago. Ms. Bhutto’s death can be a unifying event that can bring together a real coalition, not the flimsy group that was assembled to remove Saddam Hussein. The war against Al Qaeda is not over and we need to put our eyes back on the prize.

Let Iraq have their civil war. We need to permanently stop an organization that has repeatedly demonstrated that it is capable of carrying out successful attacks both there and here. President Bush, do what is right and shift troops from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is obvious that Musharraf is not the leader we thought he was. Instead of talking tough, let us take substantive measures that will force him to face the Taliban and beat them with his own army and resources with additional assistance from a U.S.-led battalion. The world can gain from Ms. Bhutto’s death. Let’s continue the movement that she started and defeat these thugs.